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TIME AND OTHERS TYPES OF DURATION
IN PLATO’S COSMOLOGY
O TEMPO E OUTROS TIPOS DE DURAÇÃO
NA COSMOLOGIA DE PLATÃO
THOMAS M. ROBINSON*
Abstract: This article first describes the four types of duration to which Plato
seems to have been committed: eternity, sempiternity, everlastingness and
time. A description is offered of the very startling type of entropy
characterizing the cosmos of the Myth of the Politicus, in which the universe
starts from an initial impulse, eventually returns to that point, and then begins
the process all over again, in perpetuity. This view is then shown to be
compellingly consonant with contemporary cosmological theory.
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Resumo: Este artigo descreve em primeiro lugar os quatro tipos de duração
que parecem ser sustentados por Platão: eternidade, sempiternidade, perpe-
tuidade e tempo. Uma descrição é oferecida do tipo surpreendente de entropia
que caracteriza o cosmos no Mito do Político, onde o universo começa a par-
tir de um impulso inicial, eventualmente retorna àquele ponto e então come-
ça o processo novamente, em perpetuidade.  Essa perspectiva é então apresen-
tada como sendo irresistivelmente consoante com a teoria cosmológica con-
temporânea.
Palavras-chave: tempo; mito do Político; eternidade; cosmologia.
In this paper I wish to return to a topic that is never far from my
consciousness, and that is the various types of duration espoused by Plato,
including temporal duration, and their implications for contemporary
cosmological theory.  Briefly, these types of duration are:
1. Eternality, or the type of duration enjoyed by the Forms and the
Demiurge;
2. Sempiternality, or the type of duration enjoyed by the pre-matter
of the cosmos;
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573. Verlastingness, or the type of duration enjoyed by the universe as a
totality that is known to our senses;
4. Temporality, or the type of duration enjoyed by any physical object
in the universe;
For much of this information I shall be drawing initially upon the
Timaeus.  And upon a Timaeus, I must quickly add – placing my cards on
the table at once – read au pied de la lettre, following the path of Aristotle,
rather than figuratively, following the path of Xenocrates.  That choice is
of course worth a paper in itself, but I must simply pass over it here, on
the grounds (I hope acceptable ones) that I have written widely on this topic
already, and my views (and my defence of those views) can be scrutinized
(and scrutinized soon in Portuguese) at anyone’s leisure.1
First, eternality. This is the manner of duration of the Forms, the
duration of a moment without antecedent moment and without subsequent
moment, a moment unmeasured and unmeasurable by any measuring
device imagined or imaginable.  It is a moment of such utter stability that
Plato feels the need to coin a special adjective for it, diaionios.  We might
call this eternality 1, for which his basic locution is ‘to’ einai aei.
This, I should add, is his strict usage.  At other times he is happy to use
adjectives like aidios and aionios, and his noun for ‘eternity’, by a bold piece
of transference from popular usage, is aion, a word till then understood by
most Greeks simply as something like ‘a very great length of time’.
Closely analogous to this is what I call eternality 2, a manner of duration
enjoyed by the Demiurge. In this instance Plato has no private, neologistic
adjective to proffer.  But he does have a noun, and it is the same noun as
for eternality 1, ‘to’ aei einai. What this appears to mean is that the two
eternalities share a particular quality of duration (i. e., they are characterized
by duration which is purely momentary, without antecedent or subsequent
moment), but differ in degree of stability; the eternality of the forms is
absolutely and unequivocally stable, that of the Demiurge, if comments
Plato makes in Laws 10 is to be our guide, is characterized by the kineseis
of thought and desire.
Sempiternality is the manner of duration of pre-matter, or those ‘traces’
(ichne) of matter that make up the real before the cosmos known to the
1 See, e. g., ROBINSON, T. M., Plato’s Psychology (Toronto 1995, 2nd ed.), passim.  For
an earlier version of my views on types of duration in Plato see  ‘The Timaeus on Types of
Duration”, Illinois Classical Studies 11 (1987), pp. 143-151, reprinted in T. M. ROBINSON,
Cosmos as Art Object (Binghamton University: Global Academic Publishing, 2004), pp. 23-31.
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58 senses came into being.  Its manner of duration is what might be thought
of as sequential were there to be some measuring device to measure the
sequentiality.  Faute de mieux, it has to be described sequentially for us to
get a handle on it at all, and this Plato does, in a famous passage at 52d-53c.
What we need to understand here is that eternality, in both its
variations, is a characteristic of immaterial objects only.  Sempiternality is
its exact analogue in the realm of the physical, and is a characteristic of the
pre-matter, and the Space sustaining it, which a) forever into the past
‘antedates’ (an impossible term, but one also just about impossible to avoid)
the comos of sense- perception, b) is, as the basis/sustainer now of formed
matter, co-extensive in time with the duration of that cosmos, and c) (were
the Demiurge ever to permit the cosmos of sense-perception to die – which
he apparently will not) forever into the future ‘postdates’ the existence of
the cosmos of sense-perception.
To appreciate its analogousness to the eternality of the Forms and the
Demiurge, we need of course to contemplate it in its totality.  Once we do
this we see that under this optic it, too, like eternality, is a manner of
duration that can be described as ‘existing forever’ (einai aei – see 52a8,
where the locution is used of Space). The only difference between them is
that, while eternality is such in terms of the “non-existence” of any
antecedent or subsequent moment, sempiternity is such in terms of the
“infinity” of the series of antecedent and subsequent moments.  Or, to put
it in Plato’s own terminology, the one is characterized by its “abiding in
one ‘moment?’” (37d, 6), the other by its subjection to an infinite sequence
of moments.
What I call everlastingness is the manner of duration of the formed
cosmos, i. e., a manner of duration characterized by a beginning in time (a
moment in fact which is the beginning “of” time), but, by the wish of the
Demiurge, without an end in time. As in the case of sempiternality, Plato
has no technical term for this, but two important fail-safe locutions allow
him to point to it with great clarity anyway, and those are ‘enduring
forever’ (menein aei), used of the astral gods at 40b6, and “in motion forever”
(he aei kinesis), used of the four primary bodies at 58c3, each of them
describing items that came into being with the formed cosmos and co-eval
with it.
Before we turn to the concepts of temporality and time, let me stress
that what I have been discussing above are fail-safe techniques that guide
us to important distinctions.  On other occasions Plato is happy to use both
the adjectives aidios and aionios of the eternality of Forms (specifically, of
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59the world’s paradigm, the Form Eternal living Creature) and aionios of the
everlastingness of the time characterizing the world-as-image once formed.
This apparent conceptual sloppiness bothered Cornford, who at 37d7
conjectured aenaon (ever-flowing’) for the duration of time rather than
aionion.  But the problem seems to be Cornford’s rather than Plato’s; all
Plato needs are his fail-safe devices to guide us to his meaning.
A particularly good example of this lies in his use of the adverb aei,
which can notoriously, under varying circumstances, be used to cover the
entire gamut of types of duration, from eternality to everlastingness, as well
as on occasion signifying invariability. So, for example, the world of the
Forms is said to exist aei (27d6); individual Forms, and specifically that of
the eternal Living Creature, is said to exist aei; the Demiurge is said to exist
aei (34a8); Space is said to exist aei (52a8); the created gods and the four
primary bodies are said to exist aei (40b6, 58c3); and a famous passage (27d5-
c10 has even been interpreted in terms of a use of the aei of invariability.
Once we advert to the carious fail-safe techniques I have mentioned,
none of this should confuse; in varying circumstances aei will be
appropriately translated “eternally”, “sempiternally”, and “everlastingly”.
Even, as a linguistic possibility, “invariably”, as often in standard Greek
prose.  But not, I think, at 27d5 ff. While it is no doubt a linguistic possibility
that Plato may here be distinguishing what is invariably an entity not
subject to genesis from an entity invariably subject to genesis, the context
makes it clear, I think, that he is really distinguishing the world of Forms,
which exists in a state of eternality1, and never comes into being, from the
world of sense-perception, which does.
This notion of invariability has, however, finally led us to the world
of time, where aei can indeed on occasion be used to describe what is
invariably the case, or what is found invariably, throughout a specified
period of time. The manner of duration of the world of time, which came
into being, by Demiurgic formation, at a point in time which was the
beginning “of” time, is that of a sequence of moments, measurable and
measured by something of fixed periodicity, a celestial clock fashioned by
the Demiurge for just such a purpose. It is not, as Aristotle will later describe
it, a number (or perhaps “a numerical measurement”) “of” motion, but
rather motion subject “to” measurement.  In his own words, it is ‘an image
of eternity, proceeding <on its way> according to number (or perhaps
‘according to numerical measurement’).
In a post-Kantian world, or in one, closer to our own times, where a
number of philosophically laden terms can comfortably be deemed
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60 meaningful but non-referential (Ryle, et al.), it may come as a surprise to
find Plato suggesting that, far from being just a form of our consciousness
or even non-referential, time is in fact a reality subject to motion.  And
maybe even more of a surprise to find him suggesting, in the same dialogue,
that Space, far from being an empty container (as most Greeks of the day
thought), or pure extension (Descartes), or a form of our consciousness
(Kant), or yet another non-referential term (Ryle, et al.), it was, like time,
also in motion, though this time in sempiternal motion, like that of its
contents, the ‘traces’ of matter.
What is the nature of these two realities, the one, time, described as
“everlastingly” moving in a numerically measured circle (38a7-8), the
other, Space, as “sempiternally” moving and being moved by its own
contents?  In the latter case, that of Space, Plato is clearly puzzled, and
he is reduced to calling it the object of a “bastard reasoning”, teetering
on the edge, as it does, of the eternality of the non-physical and the
sempiternality of its physical contents, the traces of matter. If it were an
eternal Form, and immaterial, which it is not, it would of course be the
object of reasoning.  But it is not a physical object either, which might
have led to its being describable as an object of opinion rather than
reasoning. Instead, it enjoys the durational equivalent of eternity (cf. the
phrase aei einai, 52a8) in the realm of the physical, and at the same time
the quasi-physicality of a non-perceptible and non-dimensional sustainer
of what in the pre-cosmos will be described as the physical-like and in the
formed world, the physical.
As the poet puts it, at this point words “crack and break under the
strain”, and Plato comes up with a unique epistemological locution, “bastard
reasoning”, to deal with the matter.  But nothing analogous is said of time,
and we are left to conjecture whether he would have spoken in similar terms
of it had he chosen to discuss the matter.  What he does say is that things
like days and nights are ‘parts’ of time, and that past, present and future
are “types” or “forms” (eide) of time. But whether time is “knowable” or
not, and if knowable, in what way, he does not say.
But one can, I think, reasonably speculate on the position he might have
taken in the matter.  Like Space, time is not a physical object.  And like
Space, it shares a major feature of the physical, that is, its subjection to
motion in the realm of the physical.  On these grounds one might be
tempted to think that Plato would have described it, had he chosen to speak
on the matter, as being, like Space, the object of a “bastard reasoning”. But
I think the temptation should be resisted.  Space is sempiternal in duration,
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61and to that degree more analogous to the world of eternal immaterial Forms
than to the formed universe, which is merely everlasting. Time by contrast
is if anything more analogous to the everlasting “physical” universe of which
it is a feature, and any knowledge we have of it would consequently be
closer to opinion than to reasoning, given Plato’s views on the necessarily
immaterial physical objects of reasoning and the necessarily physical objects
of opinion, as expressed in detail in the Republic and repeated here in the
Timaeus.
So Time would presumably have been called by Plato the object of a
“bastard opining” of some sort.  Would this involve calling into question
the truth of his description of it?  Not necessarily.  If our knowledge of Space
is something less than our knowledge of the eternal world of Forms, our
opinion about Time is something “more” than our opinion about the
everlasting world of the senses.  In each instance what produces the bastard
nature of the state of consciousness in question is the fact that the object
of consciousness in question, while displaying the stability of objects,
Formal or physical, is not in fact like any other Formal or physical object:
Space is neither a Form nor a physical object, and the world of the senses
opined by Time is, unlike any other putative physical object, one with no
physical context.
What is interesting here, I think, and brings together the concepts of
Space and Time in a very alluring way, is their stability, parasitic in each
instance upon the universe each inhabits.  If Space is knowable, albeit with
a quality of knowledge something less than knowledge of the world of
Forms, it is because it has something approaching the stability of the world
of Forms.  In like fashion, if Time is opinable, it will be with a degree of
Opinion considerably more stable than our opinions of ordinary sense
objects, since the everlasting world of the senses is not, as a sense-object (and
Plato, a little disconcertingly, believes it is a sense-object), subject to change
in the way any objects “composing” it are subject to change.  So the opinion
in question will, paradoxically, be something “more” than what Plato calls
“true” opinion, its bastard nature being entirely a function of Time’s real
but non-objective status, just as the bastard nature of our “knowledge” of
Space is a function of “its” real but non-objective status.
This is heady stuff, but it would be a mistake to think that it is Plato’s
last word on the subject.  For something even more challenging, we need
to look at the notions of entropy, the apparent “reversibility” of time, and
the temporal evolution of human form, in the myth of the Statesman, and
to this I now turn. Here we have an apparent cosmology which shares a
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62 few of the features of the cosmology of the Timaeus, and we can begin the
discussion by simply listing them.
1. From a state of chaos or confusion or disorder (ataxia) the Demiurge
produced a world of some sort of order
2. The world formed by the Demiurge is characterized by the
possession of rational soul.  This rationality is constrained by what
to somatoeides (“the bodily”, or, perhaps better, “the physical”)
permits, and this seems to be the equivalent of what was called
Ananke (Necessity) in the Timaeus.
As a paradigm, or set of paradigms, for his fashioning of the world the
Demiurge appears to use Forms (referred to slightly vaguely as “the divine
realities” [ta theia]). While Plato offers no further details on this, I have
argued elsewhere (3)  that we can legitimately infer from what he says that,
as in the Timaeus, the Forms can be understood as being eternal, matter and
space as sempiternal, and the fashioned world as everlasting.  Within that
fashioned world all sense objects exist in time.
But at this point an astonishingly new idea puts in an appearance. The
world of our senses, it turns out, once set in motion by a push from the
Demiurge, turns on its axis to a point when it can turn no more, and
proceeds to spin backwards till it reaches the state of inertia from which it
had begun.  At which point the Demiurge gives it another push, and the
process starts all over again, apparently everlastingly.
The model Plato uses to describe this phenomenon is that of an orrery,
anchored to a pivot on the floor and tied to the ceiling of a room by a cord.
The so-called “forward”, or original spin comes to a halt when the cord has
tightened to its utmost, at which point the backward spin takes over to the
point of a maximum loosening of the tension, leading to a second halt, a
fresh push to restart the process, and so on.
Each “unwinding” process, it should be added, involves a reversal of
time, and a reversal of history, biological and otherwise.  In Plato’s
description, creatures eventually grow not older but younger (270d-e), they
become “diseased” and ”roken apart”, and also gradually smaller in size, such
that they eventually ‘risk disappearing’ altogether.  It is, in fact, the periodic
‘dying’ of the universe, which is then restored to life by another push by
the Demiurge in a “forward” direction. Where we are at present appears
to be on one of universe’s “backward” spins.
What has happened? Has Plato lost his senses? Well, not really.  He has,
rather, between the writing of the Timaeus and the Statesman, realized that
no satisfactory cosmology can possibly be formulated unless it takes account
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63of what we have now learned to call the second law of thermodynamics.
He was clearly aware of this law in our own micro-environment, as his
description in the Republic of what happens to a spinning top demonstrates.
And he is also fully aware of it in the Timaeus too, though its cosmological
implications seem to disturb him.  So much so that, confronted with the
natural possibility that the universe, being, as he thinks it is, a physical
object just like any other physical object, will be subject to entropy just like
them, and finally cease to be, he recoils at the possibility and says bluntly
that the fiat of the Demiurge will not allow it.
Why he might have thought this is certainly an interesting question.
Perhaps this was another instance to him, like the possibility that the
universe might have had a created model rather than an eternal Form (Tim.
29a), of a possibility that it is blasphemous (ou themis) even to formulate in
words.   But in the context he makes no comment.
The next time we find him broaching the matter, however, in the
Statesman, a major new subtlety has been introduced into the equation, and
entropy, by extrapolation, for the universe as a whole is now taken to be a
reasonable cosmological expectation.  Like any other physical object in
motion, the universe will, it is said, periodically run down.  But, differently
from any other physical object, it will also be subject to the divine fiat of
everlastingness he had mentioned earlier on in the Timaeus.  So each death
will co-incide with a new birth, by a specific divine intervention, and so
on in perpetuity.  And the everlastingess of things will now involve, not
the single rectilinear sequentiality of the world we know, but an infinite
number of births and deaths of such worlds, each subject to the second law
of thermodynamics and each needing divine intervention to restart the
process.
Bizarre as Plato’s detailed view of all this, in terms of supposedly
forward and backward world-rotations, may have sounded till fairly
recently, they have in fact become part of relatively commonplace thinking
for contemporary cosmology. There is large scale agreement among
cosmologists that the universe is indeed, as Plato said, finite; that it has a
beginning in time which is the first point “of” time; that it is in state of
outward motion (in some sense of the word ‘outward’ that has to be
accommodated to four-dimensionality); that there is some possibility that,
having reached its outermost limit for expansion, it will begin a tumultuous
journey back to the primal atomic state form which it began; that another
Big Bang could restart the process of expansion; and that his process could
go on everlastingly.  I make no claims for the truth of these postulations,
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64 of course; I merely mention them to indicate how large numbers of
contemporary physicists are now espousing theories remarkably congruent
with what Plato says in the so-called ‘myth’ of the Statesman, and clearly
finding them in now way bizarre or eccentric.
Aided by the enormously liberating influence of the concept of quadri-
dimensionality, modern science can now of course imagine (or at any rate
talk about) a universe that is finite but unbounded, something inconceivable
to the Greeks.  With this as a tool, they can postulate an oscillating universe
conceived of in terms of everlasting expansion and contraction. Denied this
tool, but finally adverting to the second law of thermodynamics, Plato,
within the constraints of a purely three-dimensional view of things, comes
up, in the Statesman, with a theory as plausible, I would say, in its time as
the Big Bang theory seems to be to so many physicists today.
Granting to Plato, argumenti causa, that the universe is, not just finite,
but also itself a physical object (a much more difficult pill to swallow, I
grant), and that any putative oscillation to which it might be subject will
need to take place within the confines of its three-dimensional circularity,
the Platonic world will oscillate everlastingly in the only way left to it, that
is, in temporal sequentiality and within the framework of its axial rotation.
Which is exactly of course what the Statesman account says it does.
But surely talk about reversal of time and history, it might be objected,
is simple nonsense, and not worthy of further comment. Maybe.  But it is
worth pointing out the even Stephen Hawking believed for a while that,
if the Oscillation theory of the universe is soundly based (as he thinks it
is), then during the period of the Great Return (or Big Crunch) we can
expect a complete reversal of time and history, in which broken cups will
be re-constituted, and the like.  I quote him not because what he says seems
plausible; it does not, and he abandoned this notion, I’m happy to say, soon
after he formulated it.2 But it is a natural avenue of speculation to explore,
once one is into cosmologies of this order.
Part of Plato’s own exploration fascinatingly involves what - unlike
Aristotle - he takes to be human evolution through time, and in particular
our evolution from an antecedent state of non-sexed forms to our current
state.  The Demiurge did not, it is claimed, create us as beings already
equipped with sexual organs; that came later, in the early stages of the
world’s first backward rotation.
2 HAWKING, Stephen, A Brief History of Time (New York: Bantam Books), chapter 9.
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65We can, I think, pass over the details of this.  What is more important
is to ask “why” Plato might have argued in this way.  Why did he want to
say that the world of temporal process is a world involving major evolution
in how its supreme creature, homo sapiens, came to be?  He had, as it
happens, already hinted at this in a little-read passage of the Timaeus  (90e
ff), where (on one interpretation at any rate) the first humans were what I
think might be appropriately called ‘psychological males’ only, unpossessed
of sex organs.  It was only in a second generation, after a virtuous or less
than virtuous life as psychological males, that the virtuous returned as
biologically equipped males and the non-virtuous as biologically equipped
females, and human reproduction as we know it began.
But let us return to the question of why he might have had any such
thoughts about time and human history.  A good way of getting at the
answer seems to me to lie in looking at a contrasting view, that of the
nineteenth century biologist Philip Gosse.3 In his extraordinary book
Omphalos he asked the question whether Adam, in another famous text
which appears to state unequivocally that the world was fashioned by a
Maker, had a navel or not. If he did not, then there was reason for thinking
he wasn’t fully human; humans have navels.  But if he did have navel, he
bore on his body the marks of a biological history he had never experienced,
and in this sense his Maker was deceiving us.
As a devout Christian, but also a biologist who did not believe in
evolution, Gosse was between a rock and hard place; either solution to the
question he had posed himself had its problems.  He finished up opting for
the view that Adam “had” a navel, arguing further that, if this is a reasonable
thing to believe, there is no reason to doubt that, in similar fashion, God
might also have filled the earth with fossils that represent a history of the
“cosmos” that had never taken place. As for any question ‘Why?’ that might
be asked, we must console ourselves with the answer that the ways God
wishes to test our faith are many, and this is just one of them.
Plato, it seems to me, faces a similar problem, but more plausibly opts
for the very opposite conclusion to the one drawn by Gosse.  If, at the
beginning of what from then on would be called time, he seems to be saying,
the Demiurge fashioned a cosmos or set of cosmoi, and also fashioned
humans at that same beginning, then there is no reason to think those
humans would be equipped with sexual organs, since such organs would
3 GOSSE, Philip, Omphalos (London, 1857).
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66 suggest a biological history they had never in fact had.  Sexual
differentiation, and with it the sexual generation of the race, would come
later on in the process – a point made in clearly in the Statesman and very
possibly also in the Timaeus, as we have just seen.
In all of this we have reached the greatest height of Plato’s cosmological
imaginativeness, a height where he is I think comparable to the greatest
cosmologists and philosophers of science.  After this, in the Phaedrus and
Laws, he moves in another direction, with a newly formulated doctrine of
soul as self-activating activity that leaves no room for a world of time
originating and operating within a context of everlastingess.  From this
point on time will be seen by him as simple rectilinear sequentiality within
a context of cosmic sempiternity.  And this, I am pained to say, seems to
me to constitute a significant and unfortunate step backwards in his
cosmological thinking.  But that is another paper.
[ recebido em maio 2006]
